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Lost Coherence

Paper 1 of the Civilisational Architecture series.

Unified Social Energy, the Monument Problem, and the
Structural Conditions of Civilisational Flourishing

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ancient world produced structures that modern engineering intuition cannot readily explain. The Baalbek trilithons have generated centuries of speculation — exotic technology, lost civilisations, and progenitor hypotheses that dissolve under systematic physical and engineering analysis. The mystery in each case is not technological. It is social.

This paper advances the unified social energy thesis: that the extraordinary collective resource mobilisation capacity of ancient civilisations was produced by the complete alignment of cosmological framework, governance, social identity, and collective purpose — an alignment that converted even small city-states into coherent collective organisms capable of sustained monument-scale effort across generational timescales. That capacity has been systematically dismantled by modernity's progressive application of individual autonomy as the supreme organising value of social life.

The paper develops three interconnected arguments. First, that the monument problem dissolves when the correct social mobilisation capacity is incorporated into the analysis — demonstrated through a physical treatment of the Baalbek transport challenge, which yields a transport time of 7–9 months per 800-tonne block under realistic efficiency assumptions. Second, that the structural conditions of unified social energy are identifiable, historically documented, and subject to systematic decay. Third, that J.D. Unwin’s empirical finding of a consistent correlation between sexual constraint norms and civilisational energy across 86 societies is best explained by two structural mechanisms proposed by this paper: the trust infrastructure that stable family formation generates, and the stake distribution that monogamy norms produce by converting the majority of men into invested contributors rather than potential defectors.

The paper concludes with an honest assessment of what has been lost and what its recovery would structurally require — not as a policy programme but as a precise identification of the functional requirements that any viable alternative configuration must satisfy.

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A Note on Method

This paper began as an attempt to explain ancient monumental architecture through a progenitor civilisation hypothesis. The hypothesis is intellectually attractive: the engineering sophistication of the Baalbek trilithons appears, on first encounter, to exceed what the documented technology of their respective periods should permit. The natural inference is that something is missing from the historical account.

That hypothesis was subjected to systematic falsification rather than selective confirmation. The trilithons were analysed through the physics and engineering of the construction challenge they present, using only technology documented as available in the relevant period and a new transport methodology developed. The question was precise: can this be explained by known technology, applied by a social organisation capable of the mobilisation it requires? The exotic technology hypothesis was rejected not because it is implausible on its face, but because it is unnecessary — and unnecessary hypotheses impose their own explanatory debts.

What remained after falsification was not a solved problem. It was a residual variable that the technology analysis could not eliminate, because it is not a technology problem. The construction of these structures required not advanced tools but extraordinary social mobilisation. The social mobilisation capacity itself then requires explanation. That is what this paper addresses.

This paper makes three original analytical contributions: a lever-trireme transport mechanism as a physically complete conventional explanation for the Baalbek trilithon movement problem; and two structural mechanisms — trust infrastructure and stake distribution — as the causal explanation for Unwin's empirical finding on sexual constraint norms and civilisational energy, which his own analysis identified but did not provide.

The unified social energy thesis is not a conclusion reached by hypothesis generation. It is what remained after the more exciting hypothesis was eliminated — arrived at by removing explanations rather than constructing them, which is the right direction of travel.

Epistemic Standards

This paper distinguishes explicitly between three categories of claim. Established findings are claims supported by physics, engineering analysis, or extensively replicated empirical data. Strong inferences are claims that the evidence supports as the most probable explanation but which cannot be established with the certainty of physical demonstration. The unified social energy thesis is a strong inference. Speculative extensions are claims that follow plausibly from the core thesis but rest on limited direct evidence. Where the paper ventures here, it is flagged explicitly.

On Uncomfortable Conclusions

This paper reaches conclusions about the structural relationship between social homogeneity, individual freedom, and governance overhead that sit outside the current Overton window of mainstream political commentary. It reaches conclusions about the civilisational consequences of dismantling coherence mechanisms that the dominant political culture of liberal democratic societies has strong institutional incentives to resist.

These conclusions are stated because the evidence supports them, not despite the fact that they are uncomfortable. The defence against the predictable opposition is not moderation of the conclusions. It is the precision of the analytical register — language that forces engagement with the mechanism rather than permitting dismissal through association with politically inconvenient positions.

The homogeneity-freedom trade-off is a coordination cost argument, not a cultural preference claim. The atomisation diagnosis is a measurable structural pathology with documented causal mechanisms, not a conservative lament about cultural decline. The Unwin corroboration is an empirical pattern of unusual breadth, and the mechanisms offered to explain it are structural and falsifiable.

Scope and Series Context

This paper does not advocate for any specific policy programme. It identifies structural relationships and their civilisational consequences. The contribution is diagnostic and structural: naming what has been lost, the mechanism by which it was lost, and the functional requirements of any viable alternative. Section 6 sets out the falsifiable predictions that follow from the thesis.

This paper is the first in a six-part series — the Prothean Civilisational Architecture — which develops a unified analytical framework from diagnosis through mechanism to application. Lost Coherence establishes the diagnostic foundation. It is deliberately diagnostic rather than prescriptive. The prescriptive and constructive work is the task of the papers that follow.

Paper 2 — Thus Spake Ilos — applies Darwinian selection theory and Madisonian institutional analysis to the religious tradition that provided the vertical trust transmission technology Lost Coherence identifies as the unsolved problem of post-religious modernity. The question is not metaphysical. It is structural: what properties of a behavioural code determine civilisational survival, and what the evidence of religious selection reveals about the functional architecture of the societies that adopted it.

Paper 3 — The Threshold — examines the developmental conditions under which human maturity is actually completed, and what the modern institutional and cultural environment has done to those conditions. The theory resolves a

genuine tension in the developmental literature that is almost never addressed honestly — and its implications for what the atomisation process is producing at population scale are more disturbing than the fertility data alone suggests.

Paper 4 — The Cage We Built — examines the modern depression epidemic as a structural phenomenon rather than a clinical one. The standard explanatory frameworks — neurochemical, social, economic — address symptoms without identifying the generative mechanism. This paper proposes one. The argument is sex-differentiated, the evidence is cross-disciplinary, and the political consequences of what the data shows are examined directly.

Paper 5 — The Narrow Way — develops the first of the two prescriptive routes the diagnosis permits: the regeneration of an energetic cultural core through religious and traditional renewal, and the structural conditions under which such a core crystallises, holds, or dissolves.

Paper 6 — The Invisible Way — applies the preceding analytical framework to the specific policy question of fertility decline, and identifies the intervention point that financial policy has consistently missed. The corrective is neither financial nor coercive. It operates at the level of cultural architecture, at the point of maximum leverage, in a vacuum that has been created and left unaddressed.

Together, the six papers constitute a single argument: that the structural conditions of civilisational flourishing are identifiable, that their dismantling follows predictable mechanisms, that the human costs of dismantling them are now visible in the data, and that the path forward — where one exists — is structural rather than moral. Lost Coherence names the problem. The papers that follow develop its dimensions and its remedies.

1. The Monument Problem — Falsification as Method

1a. The Explanatory Challenge

The ancient world produced structures that resist easy explanation. The Baalbek trilithons in Lebanon — three limestone blocks each weighing approximately 800 tonnes, incorporated into a Roman-era temple platform — are among the largest quarried and moved stones in the archaeological record. The Great Pyramid of Giza encodes mathematical and geographical relationships whose precision challenges intuition about third-millennium Egyptian capability. The Serapeum of Saqqara houses granite sarcophagi finished to tolerances that appear inconsistent with copper tool technology. The precision-cut andesite blocks of Puma Punku in Bolivia show cutting patterns that modern observers struggle to attribute to stone-age tooling. The Longyou Caves in China present a hand-carved subterranean complex of extraordinary scale with no surviving documentary record of its construction.

These structures present a genuine explanatory challenge. The mystery framing deserves to be taken seriously, not dismissed. Two categories of explanation have dominated the response. The first is exotic technology: a progenitor civilisation of superior capability, a lost technical tradition, or non-human intervention. The second is conventional technology at scales that modern social organisation cannot readily imagine replicating. Both are real positions with serious proponents. Neither, as it stands, is adequate.

The exotic technology hypothesis fails not because it is inherently implausible but because it is unnecessary — and unnecessary hypotheses carry their own explanatory debt. They require accounting not only for the existence of the advanced capability but for its disappearance, its absence from the archaeological record, and its failure to leave traces in successor civilisations. Every exotic explanation solves one problem by creating several others.

The conventional technology hypothesis fails in its naive form because it systematically underestimates what separates modern observers from the ancient builders. That gap is not primarily technological. It is imaginative — and it operates across three distinct dimensions. The first is the technology assumption: projecting our intuitions about pre-industrial tooling limits without performing the actual force calculations. The second is the social organisation assumption: projecting our coordination constraints onto ancient civilisations constituted on entirely different principles. The third, and most significant, is the timescale assumption.

Modern observers import a contemporary relationship to time. A construction programme consuming a material share of a community's resources for twenty years is, within a modern frame, a governance failure. Within the ancient frame, it was a normal expression of collective purpose. A man could lay foundations his grandson would complete. The monument outlasted any individual participant by millennia, which was precisely the point.

This timescale difference is not merely a matter of patience. It reflects a structural property that modern societies have largely

lost: vertical social trust — the confidence that future generations will honour the commitments and continue the projects of past ones. A society capable of that form of trust can commit collective resources across generational timescales. A society that has lost it optimises for the short term — not from selfishness, but because the structural conditions for long-horizon commitment no longer exist.

The correct method is to set aside all three modern projections simultaneously: assume only the tools that were available, assume a social organisation with genuine collective mobilisation capacity, and assume a planning horizon calibrated to generations rather than quarters. When that is done honestly, the gap that generates exotic explanations closes.

1b. Baalbek — The Physics of the Trilithons

The three blocks — each approximately 19 metres long, 4 metres high, 3.5 metres wide, and weighing between 750 and 800 tonnes — were quarried at the Hajjar al-Hibla site approximately 800 metres from the temple platform¹² and incorporated into the lowest course of the podium wall. The exotic technology hypothesis applied to Baalbek fails the same test it fails everywhere: it requires explaining what the technology was, how it was capable of the task, and where it went. No physical evidence of technology beyond what is documented in the period exists at the site.

Existing conventional explanations — rollers, sledges, earthen ramps — each present significant practical difficulties under examination. This paper proposes a different mechanism, developed through direct application of lever mechanics to the specific mass and transport distance involved: a staged lever system operating on the trireme principle. A trireme achieves propulsive force disproportionate to the size of any individual crew member through synchronised coordination of many oarsmen — aggregate force produced by collective coordination rather than individual strength. The same principle would have been familiar to Roman-era engineers, and applied to long lever poles deployed in sequence on both sides of a block, produces horizontal movement of an 800-tonne mass through incremental cycles of coordinated effort.

It should be stated clearly: this mechanism is a proposed solution, not an archaeologically verified one. No experimental validation exists for this specific configuration. Its value lies in demonstrating mechanical plausibility — that the transport problem yields to conventional technology given sufficient

¹Site geography places the Hajjar al-Hibla quarry approximately 800 metres from the temple platform at Baalbek, Lebanon.

²Vigato, Marco M., 'The Baalbek Enigma', February 10, 2026. DOI: 10.5281/ZENODO.18573529. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/164548280/The_Baalbek_Enigma.

coordinated human effort — rather than in proving this was the method actually used. The paper's broader argument does not depend on the lever-trireme mechanism being correct. It depends only on the establishment that a conventional explanation is mechanically viable, which the force calculations confirm.

With a 25-centimetre contact arm and a 15-degree sweep arc, the contact point moves approximately 6.5 centimetres per stroke. Accounting for settling, compression, imperfect synchrony, and friction losses, a practical forward gain of 4 centimetres per cycle is a conservative working assumption. At 15 synchronised cycles per hour, the raw transport rate is 4.8 metres per day on an 8-hour, 6-day week. The active transport workforce is approximately 500–600 people — a fraction of the mobilisation capacity a city-state of ten thousand could sustain under unified social energy.

Under realistic operating efficiency, transport of a single 800-tonne block reduces to roughly 7 to 9 months. It is not a multi-year problem but a single campaigning season — a scheduling detail within a society operating on a generational timescale.

The transport problem was the perceived crux of the anomaly. It dissolves under conventional analysis. The residual questions — precision of block fitting, finishing of dressed surfaces, emplacement onto a podium five metres above grade — are genuine puzzles, secondary to the crux, and consistent with a conventional explanation framework. The principle holds: coordinated human effort, properly mobilised and sustained across a timescale that ancient societies found natural, is sufficient.

1c. Other Anomalies — Pattern and Convergence

The Baalbek analysis demonstrates a method. Across the other major ancient construction anomalies, the same approach consistently dissolves the scale paradox, even where precision puzzles remain.

The Great Pyramid of Giza presents apparent impossible precision. A society with the astronomical and mathematical sophistication demonstrated was fully capable of achieving this through systematic measurement and iterative refinement over a multi-decade programme.³ The precision is evidence of advanced knowledge, not advanced technology.

³Lehner, M., *The Complete Pyramids* (Thames & Hudson, 1997).

The Serapeum of Saqqara presents granite sarcophagi finished to tolerances that appear inconsistent with copper tool technology. The conventional explanation involves abrasive finishing applied to a theological quality standard: perfection was not an aspiration but a religious obligation.⁴⁵

Puma Punku presents precision-cut andesite blocks. Experimental archaeology has demonstrated that the cutting patterns are consistent with stone and bone tool technology applied with extraordinary patience. The precision paradox is real but distinct from the scale paradox; the lever-trireme model addresses the latter, not necessarily the former.

The Longyou Caves in China — a hand-carved subterranean complex of 36,000 square metres, absent from known historical records — are best explained by a sustained collective labour programme of the kind unified social energy makes possible. The documentary absence reflects recording practices of the period rather than the absence of the event.

In each instance, the scale paradox dissolves when the correct technology is applied, the correct social organisation is assumed, and the correct timescale is inhabited. The mystery is not in what the ancients knew or what tools they had. It is in what they were.

⁴Stocks, D., *Experiments in Egyptian Archaeology* (Routledge, 2003).

⁵Hawass, Z., various publications on Serapeum construction, Supreme Council of Antiquities.

2. The Unified Social Energy Thesis

2a. The Arithmetic of the Impossible

Begin with numbers. A city-state of ten thousand people — a reasonable approximation for several of the societies responsible for the structures examined in Section 1. Thirty percent available for non-agricultural labour: three thousand workers. A construction programme sustained across two decades — unremarkable by ancient standards. The aggregate labour-hours available is in the order of 150 million working hours.

That figure is not exotic. It is the arithmetic output of ordinary people working ordinary hours across an ordinary ancient timescale. The structures that generate exotic technology speculation are, on the mobilisation arithmetic, well within the capacity of the societies that produced them. And yet modern intuition knows this arithmetic does not automatically translate into deployment. The arithmetic leaks. The question is what ancient societies possessed that prevented the leak.

The question the arithmetic raises is not whether the labour was theoretically available. It is what ancient societies possessed that allowed them to actually deploy it — to point 150 million hours of human effort at a single purpose, sustain that direction across decades and generations, and produce structures that still stand millennia later.

2b. Evidence of a Different Motivational Architecture

The answer is not coercion. The Egyptian monument builders at Deir el-Medina were housed, fed, and medically treated. Their labour records show organised work stoppages when rations were not delivered on schedule.⁶ This is the behaviour of workers with understood rights and expectations. Coerced labour produces the minimum effort required to avoid punishment. It does not produce the quality standard of the Serapeum sarcophagi or the sustained multi-generational commitment these projects required. See Appendix B for a detailed treatment of the Deir el-Medina evidence.

The medieval cathedral builders provide the closest modern analogy. Notre-Dame de Paris required approximately two centuries of sustained construction.⁷ The people who laid its foundations did not expect to see its completion. Their children did not. And yet the project continued — funded, staffed, directed

⁶Deir el-Medina Labour Records. Egyptian Museum, Turin, and British Museum, London. See Appendix B for detail.

⁷Gimpel, J., The Cathedral Builders (Harper & Row, 1983). See Appendix B for detail.

toward the same purpose across generations. The motivational architecture was not payment, not compulsion, not the expectation of personal benefit. It was a cosmological framework that made the incomplete contribution of any individual not a frustration but an act of faith. Appendix B traces the financing and labour structure of the medieval cathedral programme in detail.

Wartime mobilisation produces the same pattern briefly and under duress. The difference is not capability. It is the motivational and social architecture within which capability is deployed.

2c. The Four Structural Conditions

The alignment that produces extraordinary collective mobilisation capacity is the product of four structural conditions.⁸⁹

The first is a shared cosmological framework: a common structure of meaning that makes collective obligation feel like participation in something transcendent rather than submission to external constraint. When governance, religion, social identity, and individual purpose are unified within a single coherent framework, the motivational substrate of collective action is genuine investment. The monument builder is not working for the Pharaoh. He is participating in the maintenance of cosmic order, simultaneously maintaining his own world, his family's security, and his contribution to a project whose significance outlasts his life.

The second condition is the institutional unity of governance and religious authority. The institutional competition between governance and meaning-making that characterises modern societies fragments social energy. Ancient civilisations that produced unified social energy typically did not have this competition. The Pharaoh was a cosmological figure whose governance was an expression of divine order. The unification is not incidental to the mobilisation capacity. It is constitutive of it.

The third condition is collective rather than individual identity as the primary unit of social self-understanding. The question is not whether to contribute but how. The fourth condition is non-optional social obligation: the cultural and institutional expectation that individual energy contributes to collective projects as a matter of course.

These four conditions, operating together, produce what this paper terms unified social energy: the aggregate collective resource mobilisation capacity that emerges when the motivational, governance, cosmological, and social identity frameworks of a society are aligned rather than fragmented. It is an emergent property of a specific structural configuration — one

⁸Collins, R., *Interaction Ritual Chains* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁹Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912; trans. Karen Fields, Free Press, 1995).

that varies predictably with the conditions that produce it, and decays when those conditions are dismantled.

2d. Religion as Vertical Trust Technology

The four structural conditions explain how unified social energy is produced within a generation. They do not yet explain how it persists across them. A society whose cosmological framework survives intact across twenty generations possesses vertical social trust: the confidence that future generations will honour the commitments and continue the projects of past ones. Not because they independently evaluated those commitments, but because they inhabit the same cosmological world and understand the same obligations.

This is the structural function of religion that its standard accounts systematically understate. Religion as comfort, as moral instruction, as individual meaning-making — these are real functions, but they are second-order. The first-order civilisational function is transmission: the binding of future generations to the values, obligations, and collective projects of past ones, without requiring each generation to re-derive the justification from first principles. Longevity and transmission fidelity are the functional criteria that matter.

The Enlightenment and its successors produced frameworks that are horizontally persuasive: capable of convincing the current generation through rational argument. They have not demonstrated equivalent vertical strength. They produce within-generation coordination and weak cross-generation commitment. The foundations get laid. The spire does not always follow.

Transmission fidelity depends disproportionately on elites. A cosmological framework can survive widespread non-compliance at the margins. What it cannot survive is elite abandonment. When the people responsible for transmission stop believing in and transmitting the framework itself, the vertical trust mechanism breaks. The cathedral continues to be built, for a while, by people who no longer know why. Then it stops.

The Honest Cost

These structural conditions produced extraordinary collective capacity. They also carried costs that require honest acknowledgement. Cosmological conformity suppresses heterodox thinking. Collective identity constrains individual development. Non-optional obligation removes the freedom that

modern societies treat as foundational. Ancient civilisations that optimised for collective coherence paid in individual freedom and intellectual innovation.

These costs were not borne in ignorance. Ancient civilisations operated in competitive environments where the failure of collective coherence carried existential consequences — military defeat, resource collapse, civilisational dissolution. The suppression of individual freedom was the price of collective survival, not an arbitrary exercise of power. The question the modern condition raises is whether the unprecedented security of the post-war period has allowed Western societies to run down coherence reserves that a less forgiving environment will demand again.

There is a further constraint worth naming. The relationship between coherence and civilisational capacity is not linear but inverted-U shaped. Insufficient coherence produces atomisation and coordination failure. But excessive coherence — the total suppression of heterodox thinking that the most rigidly unified ancient theocracies enforced — produces stagnation. Late dynastic Egypt and imperial China both illustrate the ceiling that excessive coherence imposes. The analytical task is not to maximise coherence but to find the configuration that captures sufficient collective capacity without sacrificing the intellectual dynamism that sustained civilisational development requires.

3. The Homogeneity-Freedom Trade-Off

3a. A Question the Data Raises

The societies that score highest on measures of individual freedom — the Scandinavian democracies — are (until recently) also among the most homogeneous societies in the developed world. The societies that have pursued the most rapid diversification have, without exception, expanded their formal governance apparatus substantially. The societies with the highest measured social trust cluster around cultural and normative homogeneity rather than diversity.^{10 11}

These correlations are not obscure. They appear consistently across comparative political science, development economics, and social capital research. They have been subjected to more motivated counter-analysis than almost any other empirical relationship in the field. The motivated counter-analysis has not dislodged the correlations.¹²

The question is not political. It is structural: what is the mechanism? The answer is a coordination cost argument — one that sits within a broader institutional economics tradition that independently reaches consistent conclusions.

3b. The Coordination Cost Framework

Every society requires coordination to function. The first mechanism is informal normative coordination: shared values, behavioural expectations, trust, and social identity that allows members to extend cooperation without explicit agreement. This is low-cost coordination.¹³ The second is formal governance coordination: the explicit legal, regulatory, and institutional apparatus. This is high-cost coordination — and less effective per unit of cost than the informal alternative, because formal rules are always incomplete, always gameable, and always dependent on a residual informal substrate of willingness to comply.

This framework has an independent analogue in institutional economics. Douglass North's foundational work identifies informal normative constraints — customs, norms, codes of conduct — as the primary mechanism by which societies reduce transaction costs. North's central finding is that formal rules

¹⁰Putnam, R., *E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century*, Scandinavian Political Studies 30:2 (2007).

¹¹Fukuyama, F., *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (Free Press, 1995).

¹²Dinesen, P.T., Schaeffer, M. & Sønderskov, K.M., 'Ethnic Diversity and Social Trust: A Narrative and Meta-Analytical Review', *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 (2020), pp. 441–465.

¹³Ostrom, E., *Governing the Commons* (Cambridge University Press, 1990). North, D.C., *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

are costly substitutes for informal norms, not equivalents: changing only formal rules produces the desired results only when the informal norms complementary to those rules also change. The coordination cost argument in this paper is North's substitution mechanism applied to social coherence rather than economic performance — and the predictions are identical.

The relationship between the two mechanisms is substitutive. Formal governance expands to fill the coordination gap left by the erosion of informal normative mechanisms. This is not a political choice. It is a structural necessity. A society that loses its informal normative substrate must expand its formal governance apparatus to maintain equivalent social coherence, or accept declining collective functioning. The expansion is the symptom. The erosion is the cause.

3c. Homogeneity as Coordination Infrastructure

Social homogeneity — shared language, values, behavioural expectations, identity framework, and normative standards — is the primary generator of the informal coordination substrate.¹⁴

The operative mechanism is generalised social trust — the willingness to extend cooperative behaviour to people you do not personally know, based on the assumption that they share your norms. Robert Putnam's research found that greater diversity correlates with lower social trust not only across ethnic groups but within them — sufficiently inconvenient that Putnam delayed publication for several years while searching for alternative explanations. He did not find them. It should be noted that Putnam himself expresses long-run optimism about the potential for new cross-cutting identities to restore trust over time; the short and medium-term coordination costs documented in his data are real regardless of what long-run adaptation may eventually achieve.

3d. The Structural Implication Stated Precisely

More homogeneous societies can sustain higher levels of individual freedom because the informal normative substrate performs the coordination work that formal governance would otherwise need to do. More heterogeneous societies require more formal and ultimately more intrusive governance to achieve equivalent social coherence. The expansion is not ideologically motivated. It is structurally compelled.

¹⁴Alesina, A. & Glaeser, E., *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

This is a coordination cost argument. It is not a claim that homogeneity is intrinsically desirable or that diversity is intrinsically costly. The argument operates at the level of mechanism, not value. Societies that pursue rapid demographic and cultural diversification without simultaneously investing in alternative coherence mechanisms are making an implicit trade: more diversity, more governance overhead, less individual freedom. That trade should be made explicitly and honestly, with full accounting of the coordination costs, rather than on the false premise that diversity and social coherence are costlessly compatible.

3e. The Ancient Paradox Resolved

Ancient monument-building civilisations were highly coherent and highly homogeneous — yet governed by structures modern standards would describe as totalitarian. The answer is that ancient governance was directional rather than comprehensive. It managed collective energy — directing it toward the monument, the military campaign, the cosmological project — without regulating the granular texture of individual life. Modern governance is comprehensive rather than directional. It manages the coordination failures produced by the fragmentation of the informal substrate.

Furthermore, the coherence that ancient governance enforced was not merely philosophical preference — it was a survival requirement in a competitive threat environment that offered no exemption. The suppression of individual freedom was the price of collective survival. The modern state, operating in an historically anomalous security environment, has had the luxury of dismantling those coherence mechanisms without immediate existential consequence. The bill has not yet been presented in full.

The ancient state was large in the dimension of collective purpose. The modern state is large in the dimension of individual management. The freedom paradox of modern governance is precisely this: the progressive dismantling of informal normative mechanisms in the name of individual liberation has produced not more freedom but a different kind of unfreedom — the unfreedom of a state that must regulate what informal norms previously managed without regulation.

4. The Unwin Corroboration and Mechanism

4a. An Inconvenient Dataset

In 1934, Oxford anthropologist J.D. Unwin published *Sex and Culture* — a study of 86 societies across history and geography, examining the relationship between sexual behaviour norms and civilisational energy.¹⁵ The book is 600 pages of dense comparative data. It has never been formally refuted. It has been largely ignored — a different thing, as the absence of refutation and the absence of engagement are not equivalent forms of dismissal.

Across all 86 societies, “with monotonous regularity”, a consistent pattern held: societies that maintained strong constraints on sexual behaviour — specifically premarital chastity norms and monogamous pair-bonding structures — demonstrated higher civilisational energy. Societies that relaxed those constraints showed civilisational contraction, consistently, within approximately three generations. Unwin’s methodology and linear evolutionist framing have attracted legitimate criticism. What has not been successfully challenged is the empirical pattern itself — the correlation, across a sample of unusual breadth, between sexual constraint norms and civilisational output measures. The appropriate response to the limitations is not dismissal but better mechanism specification, which is what this section provides.

Unwin himself offered a partial causal mechanism: the channelling of individual energy away from sexual pursuit toward creative and productive activity. This is real, and should not be dismissed — aggregated across a society, the redirection of energy that would otherwise diffuse into sexual competition and its attendant social disruption produces measurable civilisational-level effects. But sublimation alone cannot account for the collective civilisational capacity that Unwin’s data reflects. This paper proposes two further structural mechanisms, operating in parallel with sublimation, that explain what sublimation cannot fully account for on its own.

4b. Trust Infrastructure

The first mechanism: sexual constraint norms are trust infrastructure — the normative foundation that makes collective action viable in domains far removed from sexuality itself. Consider the coordination problems that any pre-modern community faces. Fields must be cultivated collectively. Buildings require pooled labour. Defence requires men to leave. Children and households must be maintained in the absence of primary protectors. Each commitment requires extending trust beyond the household — to allow neighbours access to family, resources, and dependents in one’s absence.

In an environment of unstructured sexual norms, each commitment carries a defection risk that makes it individually irrational. The rational response is to minimise exposure. The grain store does not get built collectively. The soldier does not leave willingly. The monument does not get started.

¹⁵Unwin, J.D., *Sex and Culture* (Oxford University Press, 1934).

Reliable chastity and monogamy norms solve this problem at the social level. When the normative framework is sufficiently dense and reliably enforced, the defection risk that makes collective commitment individually irrational is removed. A man can leave to fight because the normative framework makes his return to an intact family a credible expectation rather than a gamble. The radius of trust extends from the household outward into the community, and collective action at scales that individualised trust cannot sustain becomes viable. The monument is the output of that trust environment. The sexual constraint norms are part of what built it.

This mechanism is independently corroborated by Joseph Henrich's cultural evolution framework. Henrich's analysis of how the Western Church's marriage and family programme — prohibiting cousin marriage and suppressing polygamy from the fourth century onward — generated the impersonal social trust that enabled large-scale cooperation with strangers is a specific historical application of the trust infrastructure thesis.¹⁶ This paper and Henrich are describing sequential chapters in the same structural story: the construction of trust infrastructure through family formation norms, and its subsequent dissolution.

4c. The Stake Distribution Mechanism

The second mechanism: unstructured sexual markets produce highly skewed outcomes. A small proportion of high-status males captures disproportionate reproductive access. A large proportion of males is effectively excluded. This is not a modern observation or a culturally specific pathology. It is the default condition of unregulated primate sexual competition, and it is the condition that the monogamy norm historically existed to suppress.

A society in which a small minority of men monopolise reproductive access is a society in which the majority of men have no structural stake in the existing order. They have no household to protect, no lineage to continue, no future generation whose welfare is bound to theirs. Worse, the skewed distribution produces a large pool of unattached, low-status males with no stake and accumulated resentment — historically the most reliable substrate for organised political instability and

¹⁶Henrich, J., *The WEIRD People in the World* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).

civilisational fragmentation. The resentment is not a moral failure. It is the rational response of people for whom the structure produces nothing. You cannot build durable collective institutions on an incentive structure that excludes the majority from its benefits.

The monogamy norm redesigns the distribution so that the majority of men have genuine skin in the game — a household to protect, a lineage to continue, a future to invest in. Their stake in civilisational continuation becomes structural rather than aspirational. Men who have something to protect will protect it. Men who have something to build will build it. Men who have nothing will do neither, and will eventually organise around that fact.

This is why the distinction between monogamous and polygamous social organisation carries civilisational rather than merely moral significance. Polygamous societies concentrate reproductive stake among a small male elite while leaving the majority structurally excluded. The predicted consequence — chronic male disengagement, internal instability, difficulty sustaining the broad collective investment that large-scale civilisational development requires — is consistent with the historical pattern. The monogamy norm is not a constraint on male freedom. It is the mechanism by which civilisational energy is distributed broadly enough to be collectively useful.

4d. The Elite Defection Dynamic

Elites are the primary transmission agents of the cosmological framework. When elite males defect from monogamy norms — which is consistently what Unwin's data shows at the leading edge of norm relaxation — the consequences operate on both mechanisms simultaneously. On trust infrastructure: elite defection signals the normative framework is no longer reliably enforced at the level of highest social visibility. The defection risk that the norm suppressed begins to re-enter individual calculations. On stake distribution: elite males exiting the monogamy norm actively reconstruct the skewed distribution the norm was designed to suppress.

The three-generation lag follows from this structure. The first generation experiences norm relaxation as liberation. The second inherits a weakened normative framework but institutional inertia sustains the forms. The third inherits the full consequences: a fragmented trust environment, a skewed stake distribution, declining collective commitment, and institutions that retain the architecture of unified social energy without the motivational substrate that made them functional. This pattern describes, with

*uncomfortable accuracy, the trajectory of Western societies from
the mid-twentieth century to the present.*

4e. Unwin in the Broader Framework

Structured family formation sits at the intersection of all the other coherence mechanisms simultaneously.¹⁷ It generates trust infrastructure. It distributes stake widely. It is the primary transmission vehicle of the cosmological framework. When it degrades, it degrades all of these simultaneously.

It is worth acknowledging directly that trust infrastructure and stake distribution are not the only mechanisms through which family formation norms affect civilisational capacity. Wealth concentration, political stability, disease environment, warfare frequency, and institutional development all interact with family formation systems in ways this paper does not fully model. The claim is that trust infrastructure and stake distribution are the primary structural mechanisms through which they operate — mechanisms sufficient to explain the civilisational-scale effects that sublimation alone cannot.

¹⁷Henrich, J., *The WEIRD People in the World* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).

5. Modern Atomisation and the Balance Point

5a. The Structural Diagnosis

Across multiple independent domains — fertility, social trust, institutional confidence, civic participation, and willingness to defend the system — key indicators are moving in directions historically associated with civilisational contraction. In the absence of countervailing structural forces, trajectories of this kind do not stabilise spontaneously. The question this section addresses is not whether current trends are desirable. It is whether a system exhibiting sustained decline across its trust, fertility, and coordination substrates can remain stable indefinitely without structural correction. History offers few examples where it has.

Ancient civilisations produced extraordinary collective capacity through a specific structural configuration: unified social energy generated by shared cosmological frameworks, collective identity, non-optional obligation, trust infrastructure built on stable family formation norms, and the wide distribution of reproductive stake. That configuration has been systematically dismantled in modern Western societies. The dismantling was not accidental, not conspiratorial, and not the result of moral failure. It was the predictable structural output of a coherent ideological programme — the progressive application of individual freedom as the supreme organising value of social life — pursued with genuine conviction.

The goods are real and should be stated rather than dismissed. Individual freedom, intellectual heterodoxy, scientific and technological acceleration, the liberation of human capability from the constraints of cosmological conformity — these are not trivial achievements. The argument is that the trade was poorly understood — that the costs were not adequately identified at the time they were being incurred.

The Madisonian diagnostic applies in both directions. The goods the trade produced were the rational output of actors responding to liberalised incentive structures. The dismantling itself followed the same logic: politicians optimising for electoral cycles have structural incentives to extend entitlements and remove obligations; bureaucracies have structural incentives to expand their coordinating role as informal mechanisms decay; individuals have structural incentives to defect from collective obligations when the normative framework enforcing them weakens. No conspiracy was required. The incentive structures pointed in one direction and rational actors followed.

5b. The Dismantling Sequence

Shared cosmological frameworks were replaced by pluralistic value neutrality. The result is a society of atomised individuals in a meaning-deficit environment, with declining capacity for collective purpose and rising demand for therapeutic and pharmaceutical management of the resulting psychological consequences.

Structured family formation was replaced by elective lifestyle arrangements. The normative framework that generated trust infrastructure and distributed reproductive stake widely was reframed as patriarchal constraint and progressively delegitimised. The result is a degraded trust environment, a

skewed stake distribution, a growing pool of unattached males with no structural investment in civilisational continuation, and a declining fertility rate that in every country that has undergone the full transition has fallen below the replacement threshold.

Non-optional social obligation was replaced by voluntary civic participation. The result is the progressive defection from collective investment that Putnam documented in detail¹⁸: declining civic participation, declining institutional membership, declining willingness to bear costs for collective benefit.

The most unambiguous measure of this defection is the willingness to fight and die in defence of one's society. In 1990, 79% of Americans said they would be willing to fight for their country; by 2023 that figure had fallen to 41% — a near-halving in three decades.¹⁹ This is not a measure of courage. It is a measure of stake. A man with no household to protect, no lineage to continue, and no structural investment in the future of his society has no rational basis for sacrificing his life to defend it.

Informal normative coordination was replaced by formal legal enforcement. As each informal coherence mechanism was dismantled, the formal governance apparatus expanded to fill the coordination gap. The state that tells you how to raise your children, what you may say, and what agreements you may reach with your neighbours is not a tyranny in the conventional sense. It is a coordination system managing, at high cost and moderate effectiveness, the consequences of having dismantled the low-cost coordination system that previously did the work.

5c. The Measurable Costs

The data in Appendix C documents the measurable costs across four dimensions. The headline figures are stark. US interpersonal trust — the share of Americans who believe most people can be trusted — peaked at approximately 56% in 1967–68 and stands at approximately 26–30% today: a halving in under sixty years, the steepest decline concentrated in the period following the sexual revolution of the 1960s and the civic disengagement of the 1970s.

¹⁸Putnam, R., *Bowling Alone* (Simon & Schuster, 2000).

¹⁹World Values Survey Wave 2 (1990), WVSA; Gallup International Association, *End of Year Survey 2023* (2024); Inglehart, Puranen & Welzel, *Journal of Peace Research* 52:4 (2015).

OECD average fertility has fallen from 3.3 children per woman in 1960 to 1.5 in 2022 — more than halved, and now 29% below the 2.1 replacement threshold in every OECD country except Israel and Mexico.²⁰

Mental health pathology has risen sharply, particularly among young people.²¹²² Male disengagement has followed the stake distribution logic precisely. These are the structurally predicted outputs of a society that has allowed the monogamy norm to degrade. The Madisonian diagnosis is unambiguous: the structure failed first.

The convergence of these indicators is not random. It reflects a system whose underlying coordination capacity is weakening across multiple dimensions simultaneously. Several of these trends exhibit self-reinforcing characteristics: declining fertility reduces future workforce capacity and fiscal stability; declining trust increases governance overhead; rising governance overhead further erodes trust; declining civic participation weakens the informal normative substrate that formal governance cannot fully replace. Systems with mutually reinforcing negative feedback loops do not tend toward spontaneous recovery. Absent structural reversal, trajectories of this kind historically resolve not in equilibrium but in continued contraction.

5d. The Freedom Paradox

The cumulative picture presents a paradox that liberal democratic political culture has not adequately confronted. The systematic expansion of individual freedom has not produced a society of flourishing liberated individuals. It has produced a society of atomised individuals with declining psychological resilience, declining collective capacity, and declining willingness to invest in a future they do not feel connected to.

The freedom is real. What they are not is free in the sense that actually matters for human flourishing: free from isolation, free from meaninglessness, free from the psychological consequences of a social environment that has removed the structural conditions of purpose and belonging without replacing them with functional equivalents. The ancient theocrat told you what to build and left the texture of your daily life largely unmanaged. The modern regulatory state leaves you free to construct your identity however you choose while managing, through a continuously expanding

²⁰OECD Family Database, SF2.1: Fertility Rates (2024); OECD Society at a Glance 2024. OECD average TFR: 3.3 in 1960; 1.5 in 2022. 37 of 38 OECD countries below replacement (2.1) as of 2023.

²¹Twenge, J.M., iGen (2017) and Generations (2023), Atria Books.

²²Haidt, J. & Rausch, Z., The Anxious Generation (Penguin Press, 2024).

formal apparatus, the coordination failures that the removal of informal norms has produced.

5e. The Balance Point

The analytical framework identifies a spectrum with two unsustainable extremes. At one end: the theocratic totalitarianism of the most coherent ancient civilisations, which — when coherence became excessive — produced the stagnation that late dynastic Egypt and imperial China illustrate. At the other: the atomising libertarianism of contemporary Western societies, which has produced individual freedom at the cost of the collective substrate that makes that freedom meaningful.²³²⁴

The relationship between coherence and civilisational capacity is therefore not linear. It is an inverted U: insufficient coherence produces atomisation and coordination failure; excessive coherence produces stagnation and brittleness. The optimal position is on the ascending portion of the curve — sufficient collective coherence to sustain coordination capacity, while preserving sufficient individual freedom and intellectual heterodoxy to generate the innovation and adaptability that civilisational development demands.

A shared framework of meaning sufficient to motivate collective investment without requiring cosmological conformity. The secular substitutes that modernity has offered have not demonstrated equivalent transmission fidelity. The functional requirement is clear even where the institutional form that could satisfy it in a post-religious context remains an open problem. It is named here as unsolved rather than assumed away.

Structured family formation as the primary non-optional obligation mechanism, inter-generational stake generator, and trust infrastructure provider. Managed rather than unlimited diversity, calibrated to the coordination capacity of available coherence mechanisms. Non-optional social obligation in domains where individual preference imposes collective costs. Maximum individual freedom in the domains where it does not — a structural recognition that innovation and heterodoxy are genuine civilisational goods no viable future configuration can afford to sacrifice.

No modern society has solved this configuration problem. The value of naming it precisely is that it identifies what is actually being traded in policy debates that are currently conducted as if they involved only one variable. Every coherence mechanism dismantled in the name of individual liberation imposes collective

²³Deneen, P., *Why Liberalism Failed* (Yale University Press, 2018).

²⁴MacIntyre, A., *After Virtue* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

costs that accrue to future generations rather than the present one. The intellectual contribution of this analysis is the framework for evaluating those trades honestly — not the pretence that maximum freedom is costless, not the pretence that maximum coherence is desirable, but the precise identification of what each configuration gains and what it sacrifices.

The civilisations that built the monuments were not better than us. They were differently configured — optimised for collective capacity at the cost of individual development, sustained by cosmological frameworks whose transmission fidelity produced the vertical trust that made generational projects viable. We have traded that configuration for one optimised for individual capability at the cost of collective coherence. The trade produced extraordinary goods. It also produced the world this paper has described: a system on a contraction trajectory across its trust, fertility, and coordination substrates, with self-reinforcing dynamics that do not tend toward spontaneous recovery.

Historical cases suggest that once core coordination mechanisms degrade beyond a certain threshold, recovery becomes increasingly difficult without deliberate reconstruction. The monuments we are not building are the measure of what was lost. The papers that follow develop what reconstruction would require.

6. Testable Implications and Falsifiability

A thesis stated as a strong inference carries an obligation: to specify the conditions under which it would be wrong. The unified social energy thesis, and the mechanisms this paper proposes, are falsifiable. The following statements identify what empirical evidence would materially weaken or refute the core claims.

6a. On the Transport Mechanism

The lever-trireme transport model is falsifiable through experimental archaeology. A physical test with period-appropriate materials, a representative block mass, and a crew of the proposed size would confirm or disconfirm the claimed transport rate. If the mechanism cannot achieve the claimed 4.8 m/day base rate under realistic conditions, the specific mechanism is disproved. The broader thesis requires only that some viable conventional mechanism exist, not that this particular one be correct.

6b. On the Unified Social Energy Thesis

The thesis predicts that societies with higher levels of the four structural conditions should demonstrate measurably higher collective resource mobilisation capacity, holding material technology constant. It is weakened if high-coherence societies consistently fail to demonstrate superior collective mobilisation capacity relative to comparable low-coherence societies with equivalent technology.

The thesis is not refuted by the existence of coherent societies that declined or collapsed — collective coherence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for civilisational flourishing. Military defeat, disease, resource depletion, and ecological failure are independent variables. The thesis claims coherence as a component of capacity, not as a guarantee of survival.

6c. On the Trust Infrastructure and Stake Distribution Mechanisms

The trust infrastructure mechanism predicts that societies with reliable sexual constraint norms will show measurably lower defection rates in collective action contexts, higher generalised social trust, and greater willingness to extend cooperative behaviour to non-kin strangers. The mechanism is weakened if high-constraint-norm societies consistently fail to show higher generalised trust than low-constraint-norm societies, controlling for relevant variables.

The stake distribution mechanism predicts that societies with higher rates of monogamous pair-bonding will show lower rates of unattached male disengagement, lower political instability attributable to unattached male resentment, and higher rates of male investment in collective long-horizon projects. The mechanism is weakened if polygamous societies with broad-based male stake through alternative mechanisms show equivalent collective investment capacity to monogamous societies.

Both mechanisms are weakened if the three-generation lag fails to appear in societies that have undergone sexual constraint norm relaxation in well-documented historical periods. A high-trust, high-civilisational-capacity society

that has sustained sexual liberalisation for three generations without the predicted trust erosion and stake distribution skew would constitute meaningful counter-evidence.

6d. On the Coordination Cost Framework

The substitution relationship between informal normative coordination and formal governance predicts that societies that successfully dismantle informal normative substrates without developing equivalent alternative coherence mechanisms will show measurable increases in governance overhead over the following decades. This prediction is testable against longitudinal governance data.

The framework is weakened if diverse societies consistently achieve high trust and low governance overhead through institutional mechanisms alone, sustained over generational timescales. Singapore is the most frequently cited candidate for this alternative. The paper's position is that Singapore's high-trust, low-corruption profile depends on strong authoritarian governance overhead rather than demonstrating low-cost coordination — but this is an empirical claim that should be tested rather than assumed.

A thesis that cannot specify the conditions under which it is wrong is not a thesis — it is a narrative. The conditions above specify what falsification looks like for each core claim. The paper's authors invite the empirical engagement these predictions require, and acknowledge that several of them await the longitudinal data that will only become available as the atomisation process continues to develop.

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Appendix A: Baalbek Transport — Full Force Derivation

This appendix sets out the full derivation of the lever-trireme transport calculation summarised in Section 1b. All assumptions are stated explicitly. The purpose is to establish mechanical plausibility, not to prove this was the method actually employed.

A1. Block Parameters

Parameter	Value / Assumption
Block mass	800,000 kg (conservative; some estimates 750–1,000 tonnes)
Block weight (W)	$800,000 \times 9.8 = 7,840,000 \text{ N (7.84 MN)}$
Transport distance	~800 m (Hajjar al-Hibla quarry to temple platform; site geography)
Surface preparation	Timber runners on levelled substrate (period-documented technique)
Friction coefficient (μ)	0.25 (timber on timber, lubricated; conservative mid-range estimate)

Table A1. Block and surface parameters.

A2. Required Driving Force

Horizontal force required to sustain movement against friction:

$$F_{sr^{op}} = \mu \times W = 0.25 \times 7,840,000 = 1,960,000 \text{ N} \approx 1.96 \text{ MN}$$

Using 1,000 tonne upper estimate: $F_{sr^{op}} = 0.25 \times 9,800,000 = 2,450,000 \text{ N} \approx 2.45 \text{ MN}$

The mechanism must deliver approximately 2.45 MN of horizontal driving force to sustain movement of the heaviest estimated block weight. This is the target.

A3. Lever Array Parameters

Parameter	Value
Inboard arm length	5.0 m
Outboard arm (contact) length	0.25 m
Mechanical advantage (MA)	$5.0 / 0.25 = 20:1$
Operators per lever	4 men

Parameter	Value
Force per operator	350 N (approximately 36 kg downward effort)
Input force per lever	$4 \times 350 = 1,400$ N
Output force per lever	$1,400 \times 20 = 28,000$ N (28 kN)
Levers required (each side)	44 (88 total)
Total driving force	$88 \times 28,000 = 2,464,000$ N (2.46 MN)
Headroom above requirement	2.46 MN vs 2.45 MN required: $\approx 1\%$ surplus before efficiency losses

Table A2. Lever array parameters and force calculation.

Note: the 1% surplus appears tight. However, the 0.25 friction coefficient is conservative — well-lubricated timber on timber runs closer to 0.15–0.20, which would reduce the required force to 1.17–1.56 MN, providing substantial headroom. The 800-tonne figure also represents the heaviest estimate; at 750 tonnes the required force falls to 1.84 MN, comfortably within the lever array’s output.

A4. Stroke Geometry and Transport Rate

Parameter	Value
Contact arm length (r)	0.25 m
Sweep arc	15 degrees
Arc length at contact point	$0.25 \times \sin(15^\circ) = 0.25 \times 0.259 = 0.065$ m (6.5 cm)
Practical forward gain per stroke	4 cm (accounting for settling, compression, imperfect synchrony)
Stroke rate	15 cycles per hour (synchronised crews)
Raw transport rate	$15 \times 0.04 = 0.60$ m/hr = 4.8 m/day (8-hour, 6-day week)

Table A3. Stroke geometry and transport rate.

A5. Efficiency-Adjusted Transport Time

Efficiency	Effective rate (m/day)	Days for 800 m	Weeks (6-day)
90% (optimal)	4.32	185	~31
80% (realistic)	3.84	208	~35
70% (disrupted)	3.36	238	~40

Table A4. Efficiency-adjusted transport time for 800 m. Conclusion: 7–9 months per Trilithon block under realistic operating conditions.

A6. Workforce Summary

Function	Workers	Notes
Primary lever operators	352	88 levers × 4 men
Alignment and correction crews	40–60	Continuous monitoring
Runner/wedge maintenance	30–50	Parallel to movement
Lubrication and path prep	30–50	Ahead of block
Supervision and coordination	20–30	Rhythm-keeping critical
Total active workforce	~470–540	Well within city-state capacity

Table A5. Estimated active workforce for a single Trilithon block transport operation.

Appendix B: Case Studies in Unified Social Energy

B1. Deir el-Medina: The Organisational Structure of Ancient Egyptian Monument Construction

The village of Deir el-Medina, on the west bank of the Nile at Thebes, housed the workforce responsible for constructing and decorating the royal tombs of the New Kingdom (c.1550–c.1070 BCE). The ostraca and papyri recovered from the site represent one of the most complete administrative archives from the ancient world, and they provide direct evidence of the organisational and motivational structure of Egyptian monument construction workforces.

The workforce was organised into two gangs, each under a foreman, with a complement of approximately 60 workers at its height under Ramesses II. Workers were classified as skilled specialists — stone-cutters, painters, draughtsmen, scribes — and supported by a logistics apparatus that included water-carriers, laundry workers, physicians, and security personnel. The state supplied food rations, clothing, tools, and medical treatment. Records document regular ration deliveries of grain, fish, vegetables, and oil. Medical records survive showing treatment of injuries sustained during construction work.

The work stoppages documented in the Deir el-Medina records are analytically significant. In Year 29 of Ramesses III (c.1159 BCE), the workforce staged what is generally considered the first recorded labour strike in history, marching to nearby mortuary temples to demand overdue rations. The records document their complaint precisely: they had not received their provisions for eighteen days. The administration responded by delivering the rations. The workforce returned to work. This episode — which received no particular shock from either party — is the behaviour of workers who understood themselves to have rights within a contractual framework, not of people operating under pure compulsion.

The ostraca also record absences from work with reasons given: illness, bereavement, ritual observance, hangover, and personal disputes. Absenteeism was tracked and recorded. The administrative apparatus required to manage this level of workforce complexity — ration tracking, absence recording, medical provision, security — is inconsistent with a pure slave labour model and consistent with a workforce that was genuinely embedded within a social contract.

The motivational architecture evident in the Deir el-Medina records is the combination of material provision, social contract, and cosmological positioning that the unified social energy thesis identifies as the foundation of ancient monument construction capacity. The workers were not free in the modern sense. They were also not enslaved in the modern sense. They were participants in a cosmologically ordered collective project, with understood rights and obligations, within a framework that gave their labour transcendent significance.

Source: Cerny, J., *A Community of Workmen at Thebes in the Ramesside Period* (Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1973); McDowell, A.G., *Village Life in Ancient Egypt: Laundry Lists and Love Songs* (Oxford University Press, 1999).

B2. Notre-Dame de Paris: The Financing and Labour Structure of Medieval Cathedral Construction

Notre-Dame de Paris was begun in 1163 under Bishop Maurice de Sully and largely completed in structural terms by approximately 1345 — a construction programme of approximately 180 years. It represents the closest available analogy to ancient monumental construction in the historical record: a multi-generational collective project sustained across generations of participants who would not live to see its completion, financed through a complex combination of institutional, civic, and popular investment, and motivated by a cosmological framework that made each individual contribution meaningful regardless of the contributor's relationship to the completed whole.

The financing structure was neither purely state-directed nor purely market-driven. Initial financing came from the Bishop and the cathedral chapter; subsequent major gifts from the French Crown, the nobility, and the guilds; and continuous small contributions from ordinary Parisians and pilgrims. The guild contribution is analytically significant: craft guilds — stonecutters, masons, carpenters, glaziers, sculptors — contributed both labour and financial resources, and the stained glass windows donated by specific guilds (visible in the records and in some surviving examples) represent a form of collective investment in a project whose completion horizon exceeded any individual guild member's lifetime.

The workforce was organised around the building lodge, or 'chantier', which functioned as both a physical workplace and a social institution. Master builders held the equivalent of professional status; journeymen moved between sites carrying specialist knowledge; apprentices were trained within the lodge. The social organisation of the cathedral-building workforce — hierarchical, specialised, mobile across generations — is the closest medieval equivalent to the administrative complexity documented at Deir el-Medina.

The motivational architecture was explicitly cosmological. Cathedral construction was understood as an act of corporate worship — the building itself as a form of prayer, the labour as a form of sacrifice. The theological framework that gave meaning to the incomplete contribution — that a man who laid a single course of stone in a cathedral he would not live to see completed was participating in something that outlasted and transcended him — is the vertical trust mechanism in operation. The framework transmitted the obligation intact from founders to completers across 180 years because it was the same framework at the end as at the beginning.

The contrast with modern construction is instructive. The Sydney Opera House, begun in 1959 and completed in 1973, took 14 years, cost four times its original budget, involved the dismissal of its architect, and generated sustained political controversy throughout. A 180-year construction programme under modern conditions is not imaginable — not because the engineering is beyond us, but because the social and motivational architecture that made 180-year commitment credible has been dismantled.

Source: Gimpel, J., *The Cathedral Builders* (Harper & Row, 1983); Murray, S., *Notre-Dame, Cathedral of Amiens: The Power of Change in Gothic* (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Appendix C: Measurable Costs of Atomisation — Key Data

The following tables summarise the primary quantitative evidence for the atomisation thesis presented in Section 5. All figures are drawn from publicly available survey and institutional data. Sources are cited in the main text footnotes.

C1. US Interpersonal Trust Decline (1948–2023)

Period	% saying “most people can be trusted”	Source
Late 1940s–50s	~66%	NORC / Lane (1965)
1967–68 (peak)	~56%	DDB Life Style Survey
Early 1970s	~46%	General Social Survey (NORC)
Mid-1990s	~38%	General Social Survey (NORC)
2022–23	~26–30%	GSS / World Happiness Report 2025

Table C1. US interpersonal trust: share of adults saying “most people can be trusted”, 1948–2023. Decline of approximately 50% from peak (1967–68) to present. Sources: General Social Survey (NORC), DDB Life Style Survey, World Happiness Report 2025.

C2. US Trust in Federal Government (1964–2023)

Year	% trusting government “always/most of the time”	Source
1964	77%	Pew Research / ANES
1974	36%	Pew Research / ANES
1984	~44%	Pew Research / ANES
2001 (pre-9/11)	31%	CBS/NYT poll
2001 (post-9/11)	60%	Gallup
2015	19%	Pew Research Center

Year	% trusting government “always/most of the time”	Source
2023	~20%	Pew Research Center

Table C2. US trust in federal government, 1964–2023. Decline from 77% (1964 peak) to approximately 20% today. The post-9/11 spike illustrates the temporary restoration of trust under existential threat conditions — consistent with the survival requirement argument in Section 2. Source: Pew Research Center, Public Trust in Government: 1958–2015.

C3. OECD Fertility Rate Decline (1960–2023)

Year	OECD Average TFR	vs Replacement (2.1)	Notable
1960	3.3	+57% above	All OECD above replacement
1980	2.0	5% below	Most OECD near or below
2000	1.7	19% below	Brief rebound begins
2008	1.8	14% below	Rebound stalls post-GFC
2022	1.5	29% below	37/38 OECD below replacement
2023 (Korea)	0.72	66% below	Lowest recorded in OECD

Table C3. OECD average total fertility rate, 1960–2023. The OECD average has halved from 3.3 in 1960 to 1.5 in 2022, 29% below the 2.1 replacement level. 37 of 38 OECD countries are now below replacement. Source: OECD Family Database SF2.1; OECD Society at a Glance 2024.

C4. Willingness to Fight for Country — USA (1990–2023)

Year	% willing to fight for country (USA)	Source
1990	79%	World Values Survey Wave 2
2015 (approx.)	~56%	WIN/Gallup International
2023	41%	Gallup International End of Year Survey

Table C4. US willingness to fight for country, 1990–2023. Near-halving (79% to 41%) in three decades. Gallup International notes the decline is consistent across all Western countries surveyed. Source: WVS Wave 2 (1990); Gallup International End of Year Survey 2023.

C5. Unwin’s 86-Society Pattern — Summary

Sexual Constraint Level	Civilisational Energy	Monument Construction	Expansion Capacity
High (chastity + monogamy norms)	High	Present/documented	High
Medium (partial constraints)	Moderate	Variable	Moderate
Low (relaxed norms)	Declining (within ~3 gens)	Declining/absent	Declining
Pattern consistency	"Monotonous regularity"	Across all 86 societies	Across all regions/periods

Table C5. Summary of Unwin's empirical pattern across 86 societies. Unwin's own description: "monotonous regularity." Source: Unwin, J.D., *Sex and Culture* (Oxford University Press, 1934). Note: This table represents Unwin's reported pattern; the causal mechanisms are those proposed by this paper, not by Unwin himself.

About Prothean Institute

The Prothean Institute is an independent research organisation dedicated to understanding the structural conditions of civilisational flourishing — and to preserving that understanding for those who come after.

We take seriously what history demonstrates and modern institutions prefer to ignore: that civilisations are not the default condition of human organisation. They are fragile achievements, sustained by specific cultural, developmental, and institutional conditions that can be eroded gradually and lost completely. The mechanisms of that erosion are not mysterious. They are structural, predictable, and — where identified early enough — addressable.

Prothean's work is grounded in three intellectual commitments.

The first is epistemic rigour without institutional deference. Institutional consensus is a data point, not a ceiling. Where the evidence leads to conclusions outside the current Overton window, we follow the evidence and state the conclusions clearly. We distinguish carefully between what is established, what is inferred, and what is speculative — but we do not soften findings for political, social, or institutional comfort.

The second is the Madisonian policy standard, applied in both directions. Constructively: all policy proposals are stress-tested against the behaviour of self-interested actors. Durable institutional design produces good outcomes from normal human behaviour — it does not rely on exceptional virtue. Diagnostically: all observed social pathologies are traced to the structural conditions and incentive environments that make them rational or inevitable. The policy task is always structural, never moral.

The third is intellectual honesty about civilisational stakes. The questions Prothean addresses — fertility, maturity development, social coherence, the function of cultural institutions, the conditions of collective flourishing — are not policy puzzles to be optimised at the margin. They are questions about whether the societies we inhabit will sustain themselves across generations, and what understanding is required to give them the best chance of doing so.

We publish policy briefs, whitepapers, and analytical commentary. We follow evidence to uncomfortable conclusions and say so clearly. We do not produce output calibrated for institutional acceptability, political safety, or the comfort of any particular audience.

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